

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## **Shortage of Able Men Handicaps U. S. Foreign Policy**

WASHINGTON—The United States has assumed such extensive international responsibilities since the end of World War II that President Truman has found it difficult to recruit competent men and women in sufficient numbers to represent our country in carrying out all its new responsibilities. The serious impact that the conduct of foreign affairs now has on domestic security is gradually obliterating the custom of awarding foreign posts as political plums to loyal supporters of the Federal administration, without particular regard for diplomatic skill.

For several years the President, in his search for personnel, has often selected military officers for important foreign policy tasks. But this practice, too, is about to end, even for positions which possess both military and diplomatic importance. For example, it is expected that a civilian High Commissioner for Germany to perform the duties now entrusted to General Lucius D. Clay, the American Military Governor, will be appointed following the establishment of the Western German state. The American people might begin to consider the creation of an orderly system for making available to the President a large number of Americans skilled in diplomacy by general experience or special training. The Foreign Service as presently constituted provides too few officers to fill this urgent need.

### **New Appointments**

Under the circumstances, Mr. Truman was fortunate last week in finding two able men for ambassadorial posts in Europe. He announced on April 20 that he

was nominating Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk, U.S.N. retired, as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and on April 21 that he was nominating David K. E. Bruce as Ambassador to France.

While the Kirk appointment seems to maintain the military tradition, it rather signifies Presidential recognition of the diplomatic aptitude which the Admiral has shown in Brussels, where he has been Ambassador since 1946. He will succeed General Walter Bedell Smith who, by special permission of Congress, kept his status as active army officer during his stay in Moscow. Admiral Kirk, 60 years old, has been director of naval intelligence. During World War II he commanded the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and the task force which covered the landing of American troops in Normandy in June 1944. His appointment to Moscow is primarily a "caretaker" assignment. Unassociated directly with the "cold war," he is acceptable to the Soviet government. It is unlikely, however, that his duties will involve either overtures for reconciliation or new manifestations of sternness. The chief task of the American Embassy in Moscow for the present is reporting, not negotiation.

Mr. Bruce, 50 years old, succeeds Jefferson Caffery, a Foreign Service officer who has served as Ambassador in Paris since 1944. Mr. Bruce received his training in French affairs and the techniques of international relations in the Economic Cooperation Administration, which he has represented in France for almost a year. A lawyer by profession, he served in the Maryland and Virginia legislatures,

and has a cosmopolitan background. During World War II he was European chief for the Office of Strategic Services and, after the war, Assistant Secretary of Commerce. The French Embassy now ranks as the most important diplomatic mission on the continent. The maintenance of good relations between Washington and Paris is vital to the success of Western policy, as formalized in the pending North Atlantic pact; and the two nations incline to differ about the all-important issue of the future role of Germany, although ostensibly they have reached agreement on the occupation statute for the trizone. The Queille government has confidence in Bruce, who used the influence of his ECA position to persuade it to adopt a conservative line in drafting the current budget.

### **Many Diplomatic Posts Open**

Kirks and Bruces are scarce in comparison with this country's growing need for competent representatives. When Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall resigned on April 21, President Truman had no one to take his place in a job that requires some ability in foreign affairs. The Department of the Army has the task of communicating the political policy decisions of the Administration to the military commanders in charge of the occupation of Germany, Austria, and Japan. The Secretary of the Army, moreover, is a member of the National Security Council which advises the President about foreign policy matters. The President therefore is taking seriously a recommendation that he appoint John Peurifoy, now Assistant Secretary of State in charge

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of administration, as Royall's successor. Mr. Peurifoy attended the military academy at West Point for two years. Such an appointment would leave a hole in the State Department, which now has six Assistant Secretaryships compared with the three of prewar years.

The prospective creation of the post of High Commissioner for Germany poses another appointment problem for Mr. Truman. His first choice is John J. McCloy, former member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association, now president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The choice of McCloy would leave a vacancy at the bank difficult to fill. McCloy, a lawyer, was Assistant Secre-

tary of War in World War II. In that position he ably carried out a number of delicate diplomatic tasks. The departure from Washington on April 22 of Robert Murphy, director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs in the State Department, on a trip of inquiry to Frankfurt portends an early announcement about the selection of the commissioner.

The filling of this position will not halt the regular demand for diplomats. The President must staff embassies and legations in ten countries where the United States before the war had no envoys. (Burma, Ceylon, India, Israel, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippine Republic, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). The degree of competence necessary in other posts is

higher than it was in the days of comparative isolation. The State Department itself has a pay roll of 20,000, and successive Secretaries of State since World War II have been unable to find men or women of real ability for every first-rank job. Membership in the United Nations and the specialized agencies is unsatisfactory unless the country can command the services of able Americans in adequate numbers to represent us in those organizations. While the President thus far has enjoyed extraordinary success in staffing American delegations to international organizations, a study of the personnel problem in the conduct of foreign-policy made under private auspices might result in basic improvement. BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Poles, Czechs Face Different Recovery Problems***

PRAGUE—If one goes to Czechoslovakia and Poland in the expectation of seeing downhearted people eking out a miserable existence on the verge of national economic collapse, then one has to go through a mental readjustment. And if one expects to find here carbon copies of Russia, indistinguishable from it except in name, then surprises are in store. It is just as misleading to lump Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe in a single category as it would be to talk in the same breath about Argentina and Paraguay, or about Colombia and Nicaragua. A common heritage of language and some traditions does not create uniformity in the Slav area any more than it has done in Latin America. Nor can developments in Czechoslovakia and Poland be used to measure the situation in the former Axis satellites—Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—whose economies are bearing the charge of reparations to the U.S.S.R.

### ***Many Contrasts***

Both in Prague and Warsaw people are busy from early morning till late at night working, in Prague, to increase the productivity of an already highly developed economic system and, in Warsaw, rebuilding an economy shattered and drained by war of technical skills and essential manpower. A feeling of buoyancy is in the air—a feeling which, aware as one constantly is of drastic limitations on political freedom, communicates itself to foreign observers.

The sharp physical contrast between Prague and Warsaw is in a sense a yard-

stick of the differences between Czechs and Poles. Prague, little touched by war destruction, with a population nearing one million, looks like a large, prosperous, bustling city of our Middle West. Perhaps the predominant over-all impression is that of seeing a population of workers, white-collar and manual, who are middle class in appearance and tastes. All day solid-looking people, garbed in good-quality if not elegant clothes, pour through the main streets of Prague, bent on the many tasks of a diversified modern economy. Overlooking this incessant activity stands Prague's ancient citadel, the Hradčany, which on sunny late afternoons makes one think of Tennyson's line: "the long light falls on castle walls."

The Czechs have succeeded in preserving their capital through centuries of strife by dogged persistence in carrying on with daily life irrespective of conquest and foreign influence, always believing the nation will live to see another day. In the process they may have passed by something—the spark of reckless heroism, the impulse to defy authority that characterize the Poles; but they have gained a marked degree of steadiness in the face of recurring dangers. Their main preoccupation today is security in two respects: security against another attack by Germany and another Munich, which Czech government spokesmen hope to find in close co-operation with the U.S.S.R.; and security against another period of unemployment comparable with that of the 1930's, which they hope to achieve through planned economy, including planned foreign trade.

In contrast to Prague, Warsaw is but a ghost of its prewar self. One has to see the utter desolation of the ghetto, now dominated by a mournful monument dedicated by the Jewish people to its "fighters and martyrs," to believe what man can do to man. There is hardly a spot where the eye can rest without seeing ruins. At night, under a starry sky, this utterly shattered city looks like a lunar world where life must have been suddenly stopped by untold catastrophe.

### ***Warsaw—An Act of Faith***

The miracle is that life not only goes on, but that these ruins pulsate with activity. Whatever one may think of Poland's political and economic system, it is impossible not to be moved and stirred by the daily repeated act of faith of the Warsaw population—restored from close to zero at the end of the war to nearly 600,000—who swarm over scaffoldings and trestles, carry bricks on their backs, clear rubble, and keep on rebuilding their city with incredible energy and fervor. All day one hears the clip-clop of horses drawing carts filled with rubble and bricks; all day one sees workers raising walls from dust heaps, building almost literally with their bare hands. Their persistent will to survive disaster, whatever its source, has been compared by one foreign onlooker here with the will to live of the Jewish people.

Compared with the Czechs, Warsaw inhabitants are poorly, although warmly clad; but their food, unrationed since January first, is plentiful and tasty in contrast to the monotonous diet, mostly composed of starches, which the Czechs

receive under their rationing system. Poland, still primarily an agricultural country, with a bumper crop in 1948, has plenty of food except for meat. The meat supply has been depleted as a result of various factors: home-slaughtering of hogs last year by peasants fearful of collectivization; increased meat consumption; and sales of meat abroad, notably to Britain.

Czechoslovakia, which normally balances off a small wheat import with exports of beet sugar, malt and hops, is

still suffering from the after-effects of the 1947 drought, that forced the government to divert exports assigned to pay for imported industrial equipment to the purchase, instead, of wheat and other foodstuffs. A good harvest this year should improve the situation. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia administers its rationing system with an austerity comparable with that of Britain. At the same time, it has introduced since January a two-price system like that of Russia—with fixed low

prices for rationed goods, and high prices, subject to adjustment according to supply and demand, in a free market where a wide range of foods and consumer goods can now be obtained by those who have the means to pay. This system is intended not only to offer special incentives to workers, but also to siphon off funds that might otherwise increase inflationary tendencies.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of three articles on Czechoslovakia and Poland.)

## ***Italian Colonies—Test Case On Four Counts***

The disposition of the former Italian colonies, now being considered by the UN General Assembly's First Committee, raises at least four major political issues, and involves the interests of a large number of parties. The issues raised include: 1) the competence of the General Assembly; 2) the future of empire; 3) the prospects for colonial peoples; and 4) the course of the "cold war."

### ***Role of UN***

The General Assembly in this particular instance may actually approve a binding settlement of the controversy, instead of merely making recommendations as is usually the case. Under Annex XI, paragraph 3, of the peace treaty with Italy, the four powers—the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union—agreed that if they could not reach a settlement within one year, namely by September 15, 1948, they would refer the question of the Italian colonies to the General Assembly with the understanding that its recommendation would be binding.

As the four powers failed to agree within the time limit set, the issue was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in Paris last fall and came up for discussion at the second half of the current session at Flushing Meadow, beginning April 6. It was hoped that in a large body representing the world's small and disinterested countries, where decisions are taken by two-thirds vote rather than by unanimity rule, the question could be settled on its merits rather than on the basis of great power interests. So far, however, not only have the Big Four differed, but the small countries have taken divergent views of the situation, the Arab-Asian states, in particular, lining up for independence or a collective trusteeship, and the Latin American states ex-

pressing their approval of an Italian trusteeship. Some observers believe that only a compromise on the basis of some other issue, such as Indonesia or Israel, in which these countries are interested, may break the resulting deadlock. In any event, the dispute offers the General Assembly a unique opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to act as a world parliament on a specific problem.

The question, moreover, offers a test case on the future of empire. The European colonial powers, especially Britain and France, in the aftermath of the war have suffered major damage to their economies from the loss, or impending loss, of their Asiatic possessions. They have consequently turned with intensified interest toward the economic development of their African colonies. Italy, similarly, having lost its empire, seeks to regain markets and a home for emigrants. But, since the territories in question—Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—have always been economic liabilities, the prestige value of a restoration of the colonies is the most important consideration for Italy.

### ***Demands of the Natives***

The problem of empire is particularly acute in the case of France, which is anxious to protect its own North African territories from the virus of nationalist feeling that has already shown signs of vigor, especially in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It fears that if Britain were to administer Libya, or if the area were to become independent, pan-Arab nationalism would become increasingly strong. France, accordingly, seeks to retain the southern desert region of the Fezzan which it now administers, or to have the whole of Tripolitania and the Fezzan placed under Italian trusteeship.

The peoples in the colonial areas, or at

least the politically articulate, generally wish for independence. Failing this, they want an administration which will ensure their transition to self-rule and independence as rapidly as possible. The Senussi tribesmen in Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya, fought against Italian domination from 1912 to 1928 and, in exchange for military assistance during the North African campaign, received a war-time pledge from Britain to oppose the return of Italy. The picture is rendered extraordinarily complex, however, by the lack of unity of the colonial peoples themselves, and their own divergent aspirations. In Tripolitania some native groups would welcome the leadership of the Senussi chief, Amir Sayid Idris el Senussi, while others, especially those who have not accepted this Moslem sect, would not. In Eritrea some of the Coptic half of the population would agree to union with Ethiopia, while others seek independence. The Moslem half, however, mainly opposes Ethiopian administration. In Italian Somaliland, the Somali Youth Organization, the most vigorous political force, seeks independence and unification with British and French Somaliland, the Somali province of Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia, and part of northern Kenya, while strongly opposing the return of Italy.

The broader ramifications of the problem, however, are due to the deep interest the Arab states have shown in the fate of their co-nationals and fellow religionists, as well as to the concern of the Asian countries, which tend to look upon the issue as a test case of the willingness of the great powers to grant independence to colonial peoples.

### ***The East-West Clash***

Overriding all other issues, the disposition of the Italian colonies has become another pawn in the struggle between



East and West. Both the United States and Britain now maintain bases near the Libyan coast, a region whose strategic value was emphasized in World War II. With the eastern Mediterranean area more significant now as a "front" than as a "life line," continued control of these bases assumes real importance. It may be supposed, however, that such control could continue under any settlement of the colonies save one which gave the Soviet Union direct power in the area.

The main struggle, therefore, has centered on the propaganda importance of the settlement, and the influence it may have in strengthening or weakening potential allies. The United States has a divided interest. It seeks, on the one hand, to reinforce the present regime in Italy—a signatory of the Atlantic pact and recipient of Marshall aid—by depriving the Communists of a major propaganda weapon. On the other hand, it wishes to win greater favor in the Arab-Asian bloc of nations, particularly since the Palestinian question, the China debacle, and the reverberations of the Indonesian situation have all sown a harvest of anti-American feeling. The debates on this question in the General Assembly, moreover, have provided an arena in which the Soviet and American representatives have hurled charges and countercharges at each other. The influence of this battle of words must be evaluated, along with the actual disposition of the disputed colonies, in appraising the final outcome of the controversy.

FRED W. RIGGS

(This is the first of two articles on the Italian colonies.)

## FPA Bookshelf

*Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton University Press and The World Peace Foundation, 1948. \$6.00

The latest volume in this distinguished series carries the record of American foreign relations through the critical period of the liquidation of the war and the inauguration of the present era of semipeace. As in the past, the documents are preceded by short explanatory statements giving the background, bibliographic materials, and citations to relevant portions of the earlier volumes in the series.

## Branch & Affiliate Meetings

ALBANY, May 5, *Our Stake in the United Nations*, George V. Allen

UTICA, May 5, *Report from Europe*, Vera Micheles Dean

\*CLEVELAND, May 5, *In the Minds of Men*, T. V. Smith

MILWAUKEE, May 10, J. J. Viala

ALBANY, May 11, *British-American Relations*, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham

BETHLEHEM, May 12, *American Security: Rio Pact, Atlantic Pact and United Nations*, W. Leon Godshall

\*Data taken from printed announcement

*Retaliation in International Law*, by Evelyn Speyer Colbert. New York, Columbia University Press, 1948. \$3.00

A legal analysis of the practice of international reprisals; its contribution to the enforcement of international law as well as its abuses. The author states that unless the international community finds some means for law enforcement, unilateral acts of retaliation will continue.

*The World Community*, edited by Quincy Wright. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948. \$5.00

A series of lectures by prominent American social scientists, including Louis Wirth, Margaret Mead, Kenneth Boulding, Robert Angell, Harold Lasswell and Pitman Potter, on the problems involved in world unity.

*The Tiger of France, Conversations with Clemenceau*, by Wythe Williams. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. \$4.50

An enthusiastic biography of the great French politician by an American journalist who, from 1913 to 1929, was his confidant.

*The Fall of the Spanish-American Empire*, by Salvador de Madariaga. New York: Macmillan, 1948. \$5.00

According to the eminent Spanish historian, the movement for independence in Hispano-America had its deepest origin in the divergent cultural forces represented by the Spaniard, on the one hand, and the Indian and the Negro, on the other. Thus it began almost as soon as the conquest. This is a sympathetic interpretation of the "downward movement" of an empire which, as de Madariaga showed in the *Rise of the Spanish-American Empire* published in 1947, has suffered unfairly from the "black legend" of English-language historians.

*The United States and South America: The Northern Republics*, by Arthur P. Whitaker. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948. \$3.50

This little book, one of the American Foreign Policy Library series, is an excellent introduction to the history and contemporary situation of the five "Bolivarian countries"—Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Professor Whitaker's tentative conclusion, that these countries may turn to "creole fascism" rather than communism, has already been borne out by subsequent events, especially in Peru and Venezuela.

## News in the Making

Prospects for a *land reform program in Italy* improved as Premier Alcide de Gasperi, on Easter Sunday, announced details of a bill now under consideration which would force owners of estates with incomes over a stated amount to sell excess land to the peasants or to the state. While this reform cannot materially increase the productivity of Italy's soil, it would give greater security to some of the poorer farmers and could broaden the government's political support. . . . Breaking the boycott that *interned Republic of Indonesia leaders* had maintained against any negotiations with the Dutch, Republican Premier Mohammed Hatta on April 20 flew from the island of Bangka, where he had been detained for four months, to participate in talks at Batavia. The Republicans, however, have refused to accept advance commitments sought by the Dutch as preconditions for returning them to their former capital at Jogjakarta. . . . Steering a middle course in *Arab League politics*, the new regime of Brigadier Husni Zayim in Syria received recognition from Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia on April 23. Recognition followed a surprise visit by Zayim to King Farouk in Cairo. The Syrian general, who had previously expressed sympathy for closer co-operation with the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan, has now disclaimed any intention of carrying out the "greater Syria" plan advocated by Transjordan's King Abdullah. . . . Critical of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund for what they call "safety first" policies, a group of UN economists on April 19 voiced a demand for an *immediate world-wide economic conference* to map international action against recession. The experts, members of an Economic and Social Council sub-commission, deplored continued policies of economic nationalism by individual states which, in their opinion, threaten to nullify the purposes of both the Bank and the Fund.

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